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DEVELOPING A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR STUDENT
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A LOOK AT
MEDICAL SCHOOLS
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Bernadine Healy, former Director of the National Institutes
of Health and arguably one of the most powerful women in medicine,
remembers well the claims of sexual harassment she launched while a
student at Johns Hopkins University Medical School in 1982.1 They
cost Healy her reputation there and eventually resulted in her leaving
the school.2 Her complaints were aimed at the Pithotomy Club, an
all-male eating society in which students and faculty gathered, per-
formed songs and skits, and drank.' After a male student wearing
fish-net stockings and a half-brassiere portrayed Healy as performing
sexual acts on a number of physicians at Johns Hopkins, Healy com-
plained of sexual harassment.4 She received virtually no support. In-
stead, faculty members told her that "boys will be boys" and that she
needed to develop a sense of humor and "learn to play the game."
5
More than a decade has passed since Healy first raised the issue
of sexual harassment at Johns Hopkins. The Pithotomy Club still ex-
ists.6 Healy still experiences sexism within her profession,' and female
medical students often are still expected to "play the game."8 Even
after the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings thrust the issue of sex-
ual harassment to the forefront of American politics in October 1991,
little appears to have changed for women entering the medical profes-
sion.9 Increasing numbers of women have asserted their right to work







7. Id. Scientists criticize Dr. Healy at seminars in which they discuss her plans for the
National Institutes of Health. "It is not that they do not respect her. Or that they doubt
her intelligence or commitment. It seems something less intellectual than emotional. She
does not fit in." Id.
8. Id.
9. According to Lila Wallis, a clinical professor of medicine at Cornell University Med-
ical College and past president of the American Medical Women's Association, "[mjost
women medical students are prepared to be the butt of silly jokes, a certain amount of
harassment and discrimination in terms of promotions and obtaining residency, fellowship
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in an environment free of sexual harassment, l0 but female medical
students and residents have been less willing to voice similar
complaints.
In one recent study, nearly three-fourths of the women medical
residents surveyed reported having been sexually harassed at least
once during their medical training." The respondents indicated that
more harassment occurred while in medical school than during resi-
dency, and more of their harassers were attending physicians than
classmates.'" Although two-thirds of the women surveyed indicated
that the harassment created an intimidating, offensive or hostile envi-
ronment, less than one-tenth reported such harassment to an
authority.13
While student complaints of sexual harassment have increased in
recent years,14 most claims of harassment in the medical profession
continue to be made by female doctors who have achieved a position
of some power among their colleagues. 5 Although these women
or a job. Some kid themselves and say this is just a good sense of humor." Sarah Glazer,
Are Medical Schools Sexist?, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1992, at Z1O.
10. Jane Gross, Suffering in Silence No More: Fighting Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 1992, at Al. The number of sexual harassment claims filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission in the first half of 1992 was 4754, a more than 50% increase in
the total number of claims filed during the same period of the previous year. Id. at D10.
11. Miriam Komaromy et al., Sexual Harassment in Medical Training 328 N. ENG. J. MED.
322, 323 (1993) [hereinafter Komaromy Study]. The harassment described by students
ranged from invitations for dates by physicians who were preparing letters of recommenda-
tion on behalf of the students to a physician's request that a student stand next to him
during a surgical procedure throughout which he rubbed his groin on her. Id. One stu-
dent reported that a physician asked her if she had seen the pornographic film "Deep
Throat;" he then reportedly "leaned across the desk toward her, opened his mouth wide,
and ran his tongue slowly all the way around his lips." Id.
12. Id. Another study published in 1990 reported that 42% of the medical students
surveyed claimed to have experienced harassment from their peers. K. Harnett Sheehan et
al., A Pilot Study of Medical Student 'Abuse'. Student Perceptions of Mistreatment and Misconduct
in Medical School 263 JAMA 533, 535 (1990).
13. Komaromy Study, supra note 11, at 323. For information regarding other studies
and similar findings, see JANET BICKEL & RENEE QUINNIE, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL PLAN-
NING AND DEVELOPMENT, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, BUILDING A
STRONGER WOMEN'S PROGRAM: ENHANCING THE EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ENVIRON-
MENT 19-20 (Jan. 1993).
14. For example, women complained for the first time in 1992 about the customary
dirty jokes and lewd skits performed at the annual year-end parties for residents at the
University of California at San Francisco. Gross, supra note 10, at D10. Similarly, a second-
year Georgetown student recently wrote in the school newspaper that lecturers often make
sexist comments during class and that "snickering, giggling and generally rude commen-
tary occur any and every time there is discussion of female reproductive organs." Glazer,
supra note 9, at Z10.
15. In May 1991, for example, Dr. Frances Conley announced her plan to resign from
her position as Professor of Neurosurgery at Stanford Medical School because she could
no longer work in an environment of widespread sexism. Veronizue Mistiaen, Staying the
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have been marginally successful in alerting other members of the pro-
fession to the problem of sexism on campus, the majority of sexually
harassed students continue to endure the harassment rather than risk
retaliation for reporting it. 6 Many of these students graduate from
medical school and go on to practice medicine successfully,17 but they
do so only after enduring a rigorous academic experience made un-
necessarily difficult solely because of their gender.
Since more sexual harassment is reported in medical school than
during residency,"8 this Article will focus on sexual harassment in
medical education. It will address sexual harassment by supervising
physicians and professors as well as by peers. Part I describes the rea-
sons why sexual harassment continues to be a widespread problem in
medical schools. Part II explains the history and effect of the laws
prohibiting sexual harassment generally. Part III focuses on Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972'9 and sexual harassment in
education. Finally, Part IV proposes several changes in the analytical
framework used by courts to evaluate hostile environment sexual har-
assment claims under Title IX. Section A of Part IV argues that courts
should evaluate the abusiveness of a learning environment from the
perspective of a reasonable victim and demand only that the victim
prove that the harassment made learning in that environment more
difficult. Section B focuses on student-on-student harassment and ar-
gues that courts should, in appropriate circumstances, hold schools
liable for student peer harassment as well as harassment by school
employees.
Course: Professor Who Cried 'Sexism' Keeps on Teaching, Speaking, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 5,
1993, at 10. In a letter sent to local newspapers, Dr. Conley described Stanford Medical
School as "a school dominated by men, where faculty use slides of Playboy centerfolds to
spice up lectures and women are subjected to demeaning comments, fondling and ad-
vances." Id.
16. Komaromy Study, supra note 11, at 323-24.
17. Although most women finish school and enjoy successful careers in medicine, they
specialize in less lucrative and less prestigious fields than men. As a result of discrimina-
tion on the part of supervising physicians, faculty and peers, women are discouraged (and
often flatly prohibited) from entering certain fields such as surgery. Dr. Frances Conley,
Keynote Address at the Meeting of the Organization of Student Representatives of the
Association of American Medical Colleges (Nov. 5, 1993) [hereinafter Conley, Keynote
Address].
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
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I. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONTINUED PERVASIVENESS OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN MEDICAL SCHOOLS
Medical school is unlike any other academic or professional train-
ing environment. In no other academic setting do faculty and super-
visors wield so much control over the educational experiences and
future career paths of their students.2" Medical training also involves
a commitment of time and energy that far exceeds most other types of
professional training.2' Finally, men dominate the field of medicine
to a greater degree than they do in other professions.22 Each of these
factors contributes to the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in medi-
cal schools.
Dr. Frances Conley, a well-known neurosurgeon and crusader for
gender equality in the medical profession, attributes the problem of
sex discrimination to the legacy of sexism in medicine.23 She points
out that, in contrast to law or business, women have always had a role
in health care-an essential, yet inferior role as nurse or home
caregiver. 24 She posits that as a result of this history, "[w] e all live with
a social concept, tacitly accepted by both men and women, that in the
medical profession men are dominant and women are subservient."25
Sex discrimination in the medical profession consequently remains
"invisible" to many women as well as men, and those who do recognize
it are reluctant to challenge the powerful status quo.26
Most female medical students believe that they are incapable of
stopping the harassment in their environment. In the Komaromy
Study,27 for example, more than three-fourths of the women who de-
cided not to report sexual harassment indicated that they did not be-
20. Komaromy Study, supra note 11, at 322. A medical student's ability to pursue a
preferred specialization depends in large part on the evaluations and recommendations
received from supervising physicians. Id.; see also BRUCE WEINSTEIN, ORGANIZATION OF STU-
DENT REPRESENTATIVES, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, MEDICAL EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDENT PERSPECrIVE 10 (1993) (describing the clinical exper-
iences of third and fourth year students); BICKEL & QUINNIE, supra note 13, at 23 (describ-
ing students' fears regarding the educational and professional consequence of reporting
gender-related problems encountered during medical training).
21. During their third and fourth years of medical school, students typically spend be-
tween 10 and 14 hours per day and every third or fourth night in the hospital. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 20, at 9.
22. Frances K. Conley, Toward a More Perfect World-Eliminating Sexual Discrimination in




26. Conley, Keynote Address, supra note 17.
27. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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lieve reporting the incidents would have helped them. 8 More
significantly, they feared retaliation by their harassers. 9 Medical stu-
dents invest large amounts of time, energy, and money in their educa-
tion and are understandably hesitant to challenge harassers who
control their educational and career opportunities."°
Regrettably, many female students accept sexual harassment as a
form of initiation into the male-dominated medical profession.31
They hope that if they are tough enough to endure the harassing
comments and gestures, they eventually will be accepted into the pow-
erful "old boys' network.""2 Contrary to their hopes, however, female
medical students are rarely rewarded for enduring the sexual harass-
ment they encounter in medical school. Instead of being welcomed
into the profession as equals, they are reminded repeatedly that they
do not fit in.33
Finally, because of the legacy of sexism in medicine, it will be
difficult to implement effective procedures to control sexual harass-
ment in medical schools. Tide IX's regulatory scheme 4 requires edu-
cational institutions that receive federal funds to establish a sex
discrimination complaint procedure. 5 Appointing a person with suf-
ficient authority to oversee this procedure and to enforce standards
against sexual harassment may be difficult given that the harassers
themselves commonly wield substantial power within the institution. 6
Moreover, many students lack confidence in school reporting proce-
dures and commonly elect to endure the harassment.3 7 The result is
rampant sexism in medical schools, where talented women must toler-
ate hostile training environments in exchange for the opportunity to
work in their chosen profession.
Because most sexual harassment of medical students goes unre-
ported, harassers continue to perceive their actions as harmless.38 But
28. Komaromy Study, supra note 11, at 324.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 322.
31. See Glazer, supra note 9, at Z1O (describing the reactions of female students to sex-
ual harassment).
32. Conley, Keynote Address, supra note 17.
33. Id.
34. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). The related regulations are codified as 34 C.F.R.
§§ 106.1-.71 (1993).
35. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1993). The regulations require educational institutions to
employ an individual responsible for investigating complaints and coordinating compli-
ance efforts, but they do not identify a specific procedure. Id. § 106.8(a).
36. Komaromy Study, supra note 11, at 322.
37. Id. at 324.
38. See generaUy Conley, supra note 22, at 351 (describing the harassment of women as a
cultural norm in medicine).
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to continue to train medical students in hostile environments can only
have grave effects on the medical profession. If male leaders of the
profession are permitted to harass women, their trainees are likely to
emulate their behavior and perpetuate sexism within the medical pro-
fession.3 9 Patient care will suffer if doctors are conditioned to ignore
the complaints of women patients' and trainees who suffer harass-
ment are distracted from their work.4' Not only are many women de-
prived of an educational experience equal to their male counterparts,
but physicians who intimidate or harass their trainees may also treat
their female patients with the same lack of respect and train others to
do likewise.42
II. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Only a few laws specifically address the problem of sexual harass-
ment.4" Claims of sexual harassment are commonly based on the two
most prominent federal sex discrimination statutes: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964," and Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972."5 Title VII prohibits sex discrimination in the workplace
46
and Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded educa-
tion programs.47 Because the vast majority of sexual harassment
39. Id. at 352. Dr. Adriane Fugh-Berman, a 1988 graduate of Georgetown Medical
School, recently charged the school with "buil[ding] disrespect for women into [the] cur-
riculum." Glazer, supra note 9, at Z10. Fugh-Berman believes that the sexist attitudes that
she observed while at Georgetown were unfair to women students and generally detract
from the quality of female patient care. Id.
40. Id.
41. Komaromy Study, supra note 11, at 325.
42. Id.
43. Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title
IX for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PENN. L. REv. 2119, 2122 (1993).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
45. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
46. Title VII declares that an employer may not lawfully:
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex... ; or
... limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's... sex ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)-(2).
47. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance .... " Id. § 1681 (a).
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claims have alleged discrimination in the workplace," sexual harass-
ment jurisprudence is drawn primarily from Title VII precedent.4 9
Sexual harassment was first recognized as a form of sex discrimi-
nation in 1980 when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion5° (EEOC) issued guidelines defining sexual harassment. Under
current EEOC regulations, sexual harassment is defined as:
[u] nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature ... when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individ-
ual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or ef-
fect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment.51
Although courts have consistently referred to the EEOC guidelines in
the adjudication of sexual harassment claims, they have not developed
a precise standard to distinguish between actions that do and do not
constitute sexual harassment.52 Sexual harassment may be verbal or
physical5" and may take the form of:
verbal harassment such as sexual comments or name calling;
leering or ogling; jokes or pictures; unnecessary touching;
sexist remarks about a person's clothing, body, or sexual ac-
tivities; constant brushing up against a person's body; subtle
or overt pressure for sexual favors; physical assault; and
rape. 5
4
Because it is sometimes difficult to isolate and label specific be-
havior as sexual harassment, courts have focused on the effect of the
behavior on the victim to decide whether the conduct in question
constitutes sexual harassment. Using this approach, federal courts
have recognized two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo harass-
48. Sherer, supra note 43, at 2123 (noting that a "significant body" of case law has
developed regarding workplace sexual harassment).
49. Id.; see also Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 813
F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir.) (stating that Title VII is "the most appropriate analogue when
defining Title IX's substantive standards"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987).
50. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the administrative agency re-
sponsible for enforcing Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988).
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
52. Sherer, supra note 43, at 2125.
53. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 29 (1979)
(listing conduct that may constitute sexual harassment).
54. Sherer, supra note 43, at 2127 (citations omitted).
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ment and hostile environment harassment. Quid pro quo harassment
occurs when a supervisor conditions ajob or academic benefit on the
receipt of sexual favors, or punishes or threatens to punish the victim
if the victim refuses to comply with sexual demands.55 Hostile envi-
ronment harassment occurs where the harassing conduct so infuses
the academic or work atmosphere with hostility toward members of
one sex that it alters the victim's educational experience or conditions
of employment. 56
The United States Supreme Court first addressed hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson." This case
involved a female bank employee who claimed to have complied un-
willingly with her supervisor's sexual requests because she feared los-
ing herjob. 8 Although the plaintiff suffered no tangible job loss, the
Court held her claim of hostile environment harassment actionable
under Title VII. 9 The Court noted that Title VII prohibits discrimi-
nation in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, as well as
in tangible employment benefits such as compensation and promo-
tions,6" and held that conduct which forces "a man or woman" to
"'run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living'" violates Title VI.6' The Court
stressed, however, that in order to be actionable, the harassment must
be "unwelcome"62 and "sufficiently severe or pervasive so as 'to . . .
create an abusive working environment.'"63 Furthermore, the Court
directed the trier of fact to evaluate whether an abusive environment
existed in light of "'the record as a whole' and 'the totality of
circumstances.'"64
55. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title VII claim);
Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977) (Title IX claim), aff'd, 631 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1980).
56. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (Title VII claim); Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (Title IX claim).
57. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
58. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted, PSFN Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), aff'd and remanded sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986).
59. Metitor, 477 U.S. at 73.
60. Id. at 66.
61. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v.'Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
62. Id. at 68 (citing EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
63. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
64. Id. at 69 (quoting the EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)). The
EEOC Guidelines currently state:
[T] he Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which
the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular
action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.
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In Meritor, the Court did not identify the perspective from which
the factfinder should assess abusiveness, and, until recently, the appli-
cable standard was in dispute. In 1991, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit adopted a "reasonable woman" standard,65 but other
circuits have consistently applied the more traditional "reasonable
person" standard.66 Because a determination of sexual harassment
claims is often made on the basis of whether the plaintiff is found to
have misconstrued or overreacted to the defendant's conduct, the
perspective that controls is extremely important.67 In November
1993, the Supreme Court settled this discrepancy. In Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.,6a the Court held that "[clonduct that is not severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work envi-
ronment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview."6'
The Meritor Court also neglected to describe the type of evidence
of sexual harassment a plaintiff must offer in order to prove the exist-
ence of an abusive environment. Although the Court expressly held
that a showing of tangible loss was not necessary in a hostile environ-
ment claim,7" several federal courts in the years following Meritor have
required that plaintiffs show demonstrable psychological harm in or-
der to prevail in Title VII hostile environment suits.7 In Harris, the
Court attempted to demystify the abusiveness inquiry by listing spe-
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1993).
65. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The court recognized that
because women are disproportionately the victims of sexual abuse, they are affected differ-
ently than men. The court decided to evaluate harassment from the perspective of a rea-
sonable woman in order to recognize the legitimacy of women's feelings and fears with
regard to sexual conduct. Id.
66. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (stat-
ing that the fact finder must keep in mind the perspectives of both the female victim and
her male harasser); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (adopting the standard of a reasonable person in like or
similar circumstances to the victim).
67. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898.
68. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
69. Id. at 370 (emphasis added). The Harris Court settled the debate regarding
whether a "reasonable person" or "reasonable victim" standard should apply before it
reached the issue of whether a plaintiff must prove serious psychological harm in order to
prevail on a Title VII claim. Id. In fact, Justice O'Connor reportedly asked during the oral
argument of the case: "Is it the reasonable person or the reasonable woman['s perspective
that should control]?" Tony Mauro, Drawing the Harassment Line: Court Debates the Standard
for Workplace, THE SuN (Baltimore), Oct. 14, 1993, at 2A. In writing the opinion, however,
Justice O'Connor failed to call attention to the importance of the perspective issue.
70. Men/tor, 477 U.S. at 64.
71. See, e.g., Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (lth Cir.
1989) (noting that an actionable harassment claim must establish the existence of a hostile
work environment that is sufficiently severe to affect the employee's psychological stabil-
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cific factors courts should consider in deciding whether an environ-
ment was sufficiently abusive.72 Relevant factors include "the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work per-
formance.""3 Claiming to "reaffirm" the standard announced in Mer-
itor, the Harris Court held that while Title VII does not make
actionable "any conduct that is merely offensive," it does not "re-
quir[e] the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."74 Psy-
chological harm, according to Harris, is a relevant factor in the hostile
environment inquiry, but not a required one.75
Once a plaintiff convinces the fact finder that the harassment cre-
ated an environment that would reasonably be perceived as hostile or
abusive, courts may impose vicarious liability on the harasser's em-
ployer.76 Still regarded as the seminal Supreme Court ruling on this
point, Meritor instructed courts to look to principles of agency in de-
ciding questions of institutional liability in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases.77 In addition, while the Meritor Court stated that
employers are not always liable for harassment of their employees by
supervisors, it indicated that they are not always shielded from liability
by a lack of notice. 7' Adopting these principles, lower courts gener-
ally have ruled that employers are liable for hostile environment sex-
ual harassment imposed by a victim's supervisors only where an
official of the institution knew or should have known of the harass-
ment and did not take appropriate action to stop it.79 That standard
ity); Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619 (requiring that the harassment "affected seriously" the plain-
tiff's psychological well-being).
72. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 370.
75. Id. at 371.
76. See, e.g., Lipsettv. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing, in a Title IX case, that an educational institution is liable for sexual harassment of
employees if the institution knew or should have known of the harassment and took no
steps to halt it); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding employer liable
for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII if the "employer knew or should
have known of the harassment and took no effectual action to correct the situation").
77. Meitor, 477 U.S. at 72.
78. Id. The Court also warned that employers are not necessarily insulated from liabil-
ity by an employee's failure to invoke an existing grievance procedure. Id.
79. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (supporting the rule
that an employer is liable where management level employees knew of sexual harassment
and took no action to redress it); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901 (noting that the employer "knew
or should have known" that the standard applies to employee-on-employee harassment).
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also has been applied where sexual harassment by the victim's co-
workers created a hostile environment.
80
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX
A. Title JX Avenues of Relief
Title IX provides that "[no] person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the ben-
efits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."" Because few
states have enacted legislation regarding sexual harassment in educa-
tion,8" Title IX may be the sexually harassed student's only recourse.
In addition to mandating institutional self-regulation, Title IX pro-
vides for student-triggered government enforcement.8" Under the
statute, student victims of any form of sex discrimination, including
sexual harassment, may file a written complaint with the Office of
Civil Rights (OCR).84 If OCR determines that a Title IX violation has
occurred, it will attempt to bring the institution into compliance
through informal means.85 If compliance is not achieved informally,
OCR may initiate administrative proceedings to terminate federal
funding8 6 or ask the Department of Justice to seek enforcement of
Title IX through the courts.8 7
For student victims, however, Title IX's enforcement mechanism
is not a satisfactory procedure. First, the transient nature of student
life and the inevitable delays in the administrative process typically
deny the victim any personal or timely benefit from the school's even-
80. See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (noting employers have an obligation under Title
VII to discipline employees who sexually harass co-workers); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901 (ex-
pressly holding that the "knew or should have known" standard applies "to situations in
which the hostile environment harassment is perpetrated by the plaintiff's coworkers").
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1988).
82. Minnesota and California are the only states to have enacted legislation regarding
sexual harassment in schools. See MirN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01.41 (West 1994) (defining sex-
ual harassment as unwelcome sexual advances, physical conduct or communication of a
sexual nature that creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment at work or in
school); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 212.5 (West 1994) (defining sexual harassment as requests for
sexual favors, unwelcome sexual advances, and other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of
a sexual nature, made by someone from or in the work of an educational setting). For a
discussion of the these laws, see Sherer, supra note 43, at 2139-41.
83. See generally OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACADEMIC 1 (1984) (hereinafter IT's NOT ACADEMIC].
84. 34 C.F.R. § 106.7(b) (1993). Students need not first attempt to use the internal
grievance procedure at their school. IT'S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 83, at 6.
85. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1) (1993).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988).
87. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)(1) (1993).
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tual reform." Second, settlement or negotiation with OCR ordinarily
occurs without victim participation." Third, the punishment im-
posed on the institution for noncompliance with Title IX does not
compensate the victim.9 ° Finally, the termination of government
funding ultimately will harm students if sanctioned schools are com-
pelled by funding reductions to eliminate programs or classes.91
Fortunately, Title IX provides student victims of sexual harass-
ment with another avenue for complaint and recovery. In Cannon v.
University of Chicago,92 the Supreme Court ruled that an implied right
of action exists under Title IX,9 3 and that student victims of sex dis-
crimination need not exhaust institutional avenues of relief before fil-
ing suit." The Court noted that one of Congress's goals in enacting
Title IX was to provide citizens with protection against sex discrimina-
tion in education95 and held that "[t] he award of individual relief to a
private litigant who has prosecuted her own suit is not only sensible
but is also fully consistent with-and in some cases even necessary
to-the orderly enforcement of the statute."96
Until recently, the damages available to a Title IX plaintiff were
unclear, but in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,9 7 the
Supreme Court confirmed that monetary damages are available to
plaintiffs who bring private Title IX actions.9 8 In addition, the Frank-
lin decision signified that student plaintiffs who no longer attend the
defendant school have standing to bring suit under Title IX.9 9 With
88. Studies indicate that OCR and the Department of Education rarely comply with the
regulatory requirements of prompt resolution of complaints and completion of compli-
ance reviews. N. CAMPBELL ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION: LEGAL RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 1-6 (1983). See generally Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Educa-
tion, 65 TEX. L. REv. 525, 527-28 (1987) (discussing the reasons why students are unlikely to
file complaints for sexual harassment).
89. CAMPBELL, supra note 88, at 1-8.
90. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; 34 C.F.R. § 106.71; 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (listing
sanctions for failure to comply with regulations).
91. Schneider, supra note 88, at 532 n.35.
92. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
93. Id. at 717.
94. Id. at 680 n.2, 717 (concluding that petitioner could maintain her lawsuit despite
the incomplete investigation by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare into
petitioner's case).
95. Id. at 704. Congress also sought to ensure that federal resources would not be used
to support discriminatory practices in the schools. Id.
96. Id. at 705-06.
97. 112 S. CL 1028 (1992).
98. Id. at 1038.
99. Id. The Court granted monetary damages to the plaintiff in Franklin because she
no longer attended the defendant school district and prospective relief would have been
"clearly inadequate." Id. The Court refused to leave the plaintiff "remediless." Id. Under
earlier Title IX case law, a plaintiff's graduation from the defendant school rendered her
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the addition of personal compensation to the list of potential Title IX
remedies and the removal of mootness as a defense to an action for
damages, the Franklin Court provided student victims of sex discrimi-
nation a realistic means to obtain relief, and thereby rendered Title
IX a much more powerful statute."°
B. Title IX Case Law Involving Sexual Harassment
Despite their right to sue under Title IX, very few student victims
of sexual harassment have elected to pursue their claims in court.'01
In 1977, the United States District Court for the District of Connecti-
cut heard the first Title IX sexual harassment claim in Alexander v. Yale
University."0 ' In Alexander, the court held that only students who can
demonstrate that sexual harassment caused them tangible academic
loss present "justiciable" claims.' The Alexander case involved several
plaintiffs, but the court found that only the student who asserted that
she received a low grade after refusing a professor's sexual demands
had an actionable claim.10 4 The court dismissed the allegations of an-
other student who claimed that she was humiliated and distracted
from her studies as a result of harassment by an athletic coach.105 In
addition, the court dismissed the claims of co-plaintiffs who main-
tained that, although they were not the objects of sexual misconduct,
they suffered emotionally when they learned of another student's har-
assment and of the lack of an effective complaint procedure at the
school.' 6 Recognizing only quid pro quo harassment, the court held
that "such imponderables as atmosphere and vicariously experienced
wrong... are untenable on their face.'10 7 The Second Circuit af-
claim moot. See Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Conn. 1977), affd, 631 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1980) (dismissing Title IX claims of two former students in part because the
students' graduation mooted their claims).
100. For a discussion of the likely impact of the Court's decision in Franklin, see Susan L.
Wright, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools: The Supreme Court Implies a Damages
Remedy for Title IX Sex Discrimination, 45 VANm. L. REv. 1367 (1992).
101. Sherer, supra note 43, at 2147. The Franklin Court's decision allowing Title IX
plaintiffs to sue for money damages may induce more victims to sue in the future. Franklin,
112 S. Ct. at 1038; see supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
102. 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), af'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
103. Id. at 4-6.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3-4. The court stated that the critical difference between the plaintiffs' claims
was that only one plaintiff had complained to and been rebuffed by the school. Id. at 4.
The Supreme Court has since held that Title IX plaintiffs need not exhaust institutional
procedures before filing suit. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979);
see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
106. Alexander, 459 F. Supp. at 3.
107. Id.
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firmed the district court's decision in Alexander, upholding its ruling
that the creation of a discriminatory environment without evidence of
tangible loss is not actionable sexual harassment under Title IX.1 8
Seven years later, in Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine,109
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania came to a
different conclusion and held sexual harassment that generates a hos-
tile environment is actionable under Title IX.11° In Moire, the court
stated that "[t] he issue is whether plaintiff because of her sex was in a
harassing or abusive environment ... with [the school's] tacit or ex-
plicit consent."111 The court held that though the EEOC Guidelines
on Sexual Harassment should inform Title IX as well as Title VII deci-
sions, 112 there was no merit in the particular claim before it." 3 Moire
remains the only decision affirmed by a federal appeals court to ac-
knowledge hostile environment sexual harassment in a purely educa-
tional setting.
In 1993, however, another federal district court twice held that
hostile environment sexual harassment claims may be brought under
Title IX. In Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School District,"4 the District
Court for the Northern District of California acknowledged that a
teacher's sexual harassment violates Title IX when it creates a hostile
educational environment for the student victim." 5 In order for the
institutional defendant to be liable, however, the plaintiff must
demonstrate the institution's knowing failure to act. 1 6 In view of Ti-
tle VII principles, the court stated that the harasser's employer is lia-
ble only if it fails to take "immediate and appropriate" action
"reasonably calculated" to curtail the harassing conduct." 7
Subsequently, in Doe v. Petaluma City School District,"8 the same
court held that student-on-student hostile environment sexual harass-
ment violates Title IX. 19 The Petaluma decision represents the first
108. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
109. 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
110. Id. at 1367.
111. Id. The school could be held liable under Tide IX to the extent it "condoned or
ratified" any discriminatory behavior on the part of its employees. Id. at 1366.
112. Id. at 1367 n.2.
113. The court rejected the former medical student's claim that, during her third year
psychiatric clerkship, the defendant physicians conspired to discriminate against her and
gave her a failing grade because of her sex, necessitating that she repeat her third year at
medical school. Id. at 1362.
114. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
115. Id. at 1289, 1293.
116. Id. at 1297.
117. Id.
118. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
119. Id. at 1576.
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time a court found that school authorities may be held liable for stu-
dent-on-student harassment.120 The case involved statements by the
plaintiffs seventh and eighth grade classmates that, for example,
"[she] had a hot dog in her pants and that she had sex with hot
dogs. "121 The plaintiff complained to her school counselor approxi-
mately every other week during the two year period of harassment.122
Her parents also complained numerous times, but the counselor re-
sponded essentially that "boys will be boys." 123 Although the coun-
selor promised to warn the harassers, the harassment continued until
the plaintiffs parents finally transferred their daughter to a private
school for girls. 1
24
Although the Petaluma court acknowledged that the harassment
violated Title IX, it held that in order to be awarded damages from
the school district, the victim must demonstrate intentional discrimi-
nation on the part of the institutional defendant. 125 Because the ha-
rassers were not agents of the school district, the latter's knowledge of
the harassment and failure to act was not enough to enable the plain-
tiff to recover. 126 The court suggested, however, that a "student could
proceed against [an institutional defendant] on the theory that its in-
action (or insufficient action) in the face of complaints of student-on-
student sexual harassment was a result of an actual intent to discrimi-
nate .... 12
C. A Hybrid Case: Title IX in the Mixed Employment and Educational
Setting
In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,'2 8 the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit heard a Title IX hostile environment sexual harass-
120. See id. at 1573 (noting that no court has addressed the question of whether student-
on-student sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX); see also Sherer, supra note 43, at
2123, 2152 (noting that no Title IX cases before 1993 involved purely student-on-student
sexual harassment).
121. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1564.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1564-65.
124. Id. at 1566.
125. Id. at 1576. The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwin-
nett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992), for guidance. The Petaluma court noted that
Franklin did not expressly hold that the prohibitions and remedies of Title VII and Title IX
were identical. Nevertheless, the Petaluma court held that Franklin impliedly ruled that
Title IX "damages are available only for intentional discrimination, but that respondeat
superior liability exists, so that an institution is deemed to have intentionally discriminated
when one of its agents has done so." Id. at 1575.
126. Id. at 1576.
127. Id.
128. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
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ment claim that stemmed from harassment in a mixed employment
and academic setting.'29 The plaintiff in Lipsett, a female surgical resi-
dent, alleged that she was sexually harassed by supervising physicians
and co-residents during her residency and that she was eventually ex-
pelled from the program because of her sex.' She complained of a
wide variety of discriminatory treatment: her chief resident informed
her during her first year that "surgery was a male preserve not hospita-
ble to women;" 13 she was repeatedly reminded of another woman res-
ident's dismissal after complaining about harassment;13 2 and a
supervising physician declared openly that he intended to eliminate
all women from the program. 133 In addition, she claimed that her
supervising physician remarked to a group of male patients in her
presence that he would like to have sex with a particular nurse, told a
male patient on whom she was performing a rectal examination that
she was about to give him "pleasure," and informed her that women
should not be surgeons because they are not dependable when "in
heat." 134 Furthermore, male residents posted a sexually explicit draw-
ing of the plaintiff's body and an array of Playboy centerfolds in the
area where residents met to eat and discuss academic matters.' 3 5 Male
residents also circulated a list of sexually charged nicknames of female
residents, made sexual demands of the plaintiff, and often attempted
to make unnecessary bodily contact with her.3 6 Despite her com-
plaints to supervisors, her situation did not improve and she was even-
tually dismissed from the program. 137 Based on these allegations, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiff had made
out a prima facie case of both quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment.13 8
The Lipsett decision is an optimistic sign for future student sexual
harassment victims who bring suit under Title IX, although its efficacy
in purely academic settings, as opposed to mixed employment-train-
ing contexts, is uncertain. On a positive note, the court stated that a
plaintiff need not show tangible loss to prevail on a Title IX hostile
environment sexual harassment claim.'3 9 Citing the Supreme Court's
129. Id. at 897.
130. Id. at 884.




135. Id. at 888.
136. Id.
137. Id at 892.
138. Id. at 905-06.
139. Id. at 898.
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decision regarding Title VII sexual harassment in Meritor,140 the court
stated that to make out a prima facie case of Title IX hostile environ-
ment harassment, a victim need only demonstrate that she "was sub-
jected to unwelcome sexual advances so 'severe and pervasive' that it
altered... her working or educational environment."141 While the lan-
guage of Lipsett explicitly covers hostile environment harassment in an
educational setting, the extent to which the court may have extended
the force of the Lipsett plaintiff's quid pro quo claim into its hostile
educational environment assessment is unclear. The plaintiff's even-
tual dismissal from the program may have influenced the court's ac-
ceptance of her hostile environment claims. Although the court
distinguished and found valid both the hostile environment and quid
pro quo claims, the sheer volume of the plaintiff's evidence seemed to
convince the court on both counts.142
The Lipsett decision also represents the only instance in which a
federal appeals court has recognized student-on-student harassment
as a violation of Title IX. The degree to which the court's decision in
Lipsett will benefit future victims of peer harassment in a purely aca-
demic setting is unclear.' Although the court held that "sexual har-
assment by the residents could give rise to a cause of action against the
University under Title IX," 144 it also explicitly stated that its holding
was limited to harassment in "this mixed employment-training con-
text."1 45 Thus, the court's recognition of the plaintiff's allegations re-
garding her co-residents remains ambiguous. As residents, they were
employees of the defendant institution, co-workers of the plaintiff,
and students.
140. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes
57-64.
141. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67) (emphasis added). The court
stated that the plaintiffs allegations of repeated unwanted sexual advances by supervising
physicians constituted a prima facie case of actionable sexual harassment and that her
claims regarding the male residents' drawing of her body, Playboy centerfolds and nick-
names buttressed her case. Id. at 905.
142. Id. at 886-94 (highlighting the court's treatment of the plaintiffs evidence).
143. See Sherer, supra note 43, at 2150 (expressing the opinion that the First Circuit only
established that sex discrimination standards developed under Title VII apply to employ-
ment related claims under Tide IX).
144. Lipset 864 F.2d at 895.
145. Id. at 897.
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IV. DEVELOPING A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SEXUALLY
HARASSED MEDICAL STUDENTS: PROPOSALS FOR DECIDING
FUTURE CLAIMS OF HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TrrLE IX
A. A New Method of Judging Abusiveness and Hostility
1. The Problem.--No court to date has decided a Title IX hostile
environment sexual harassment claim in favor of a student victim
without evidence of tangible loss.146 If, however, courts heed the
Supreme Court's warning in Meritor that women must not be required
to "run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living,"' 4 7 they will not require Title IX
plaintiffs to show evidence of tangible loss. Nor will they require stu-
dent victims to show demonstrable psychological harm. 48 Rather, as
the Supreme Court recently explained in Harris, factors such as psy-
chological harm, the severity and frequency of the harassment, and
whether it interferes with the victim's work are to be considered in the
hostile environment evaluation, but no single factor is required under
Title VII. 149 Courts deciding claims of hostile environment harass-
ment under Title IX should accept Title VII jurisprudence on this is-
sue and permit student claims to go forward without evidence of
tangible harm. In addition, in order to reduce the impact that sexist
attitudes often play in the outcome of claims that lack evidence of
tangible harm, courts should adopt a reasonable victim 50 standard by
which to evaluate the environment and an increased difficulty.. stan-
dard by which to judge abusiveness.
A female student who is subjected to an intimidating, hostile or
offensive academic environment because of her gender is, indeed, the
victim of sex discrimination. That she was not forced to leave her aca-
demic program altogether should not preclude the successful asser-
tion of a Title IX action. The crucial point is that she was treated
146. See Sherer, supra note 43, at 2150. Prior to 1993, Alexander, Moire, and Lipsett were
the only reported federal cases to consider a claim of sexual harassment under Title IX.
All three cases required evidence of tangible loss. Id.; see supra notes 102-113, 128-138 and
accompanying text. Patricia H. and Petaluma, the two federal cases decided since 1993, did
not shed further light on the degree of evidence required to show tangible harm. See supra
notes 114-127 and accompanying text.
147. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
148. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) (asserting a standard of
harm mid-way between conduct that is merely offensive and conduct that causes tangible
psychological injury, and holding the district court in error for its reliance on whether the
conduct seriously affected plaintiff's psychological well-being).
149. Id. at 371.
150. See supra note 65.
151. See infra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
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differently from her male classmates because of her gender. 152 In the
words of Tite IX, a sexually harassed student has been "denied the
benefits" of an education equal to that of her male peers "on the basis
of sex." 5 ' Managing to endure unfair and discriminatory treatment
without incurring any tangible academic or psychological harm does
not make a female student any less a victim of sex discrimination.
As the Komaromy Study demonstrates, the vast majority of sexu-
ally harassed female medical students elect to endure their treatment
in silence.' 54 Sexual harassment is a price they pay for the opportu-
nity to pursue an education in their chosen field. Many do not incur
tangible loss. Their loss is instead measured by the degree to which
pursuit of their chosen career is made more difficult for them as com-
pared to their male classmates. As a result of such discriminatory
treatment, female medical students often lose self-confidence, de-
velop a sense of powerlessness, become cynical toward life and the
medical profession, and forego medical specialties they would have
chosen but for the discrimination within the profession.155
The Moire, Petaluma, and Lipsett courts seemed to recognize the
intangible harm caused by hostile environment sexual harassment
within educational institutions. 156 While these decisions offer encour-
agement, they give scant indication of the type or amount of evidence
required for an award of damages in a Title IX hostile environment
claim. In fact, Title IX case law indicates that courts generally find a
sufficiently abusive or hostile environment only where the plaintiff has
suffered in some demonstrable way.' 57 Where there is no convincing
evidence of unfair tangible loss, 158 harmful stereotypes and miscon-
152. The Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education defines
sexual harassment" under Title IX as "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, im-
posed on the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of a recipient that denies, limits, pro-
vides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, services or treatment protected
under Title IX." IT's NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 83, at 2.
153. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1988).
154. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
155. See generally Sherer, supra note 43; Conley, Keynote Address, supra note 17.
156. See supra notes 109-112, 118-127, and 128-138 and accompanying text.
157. See supra Part III.B.
158. Convincing a court that a plaintiff has suffered unfair tangible academic loss can
also be difficult Courts often defer to the academic judgment of school officials when
deciding whether a course grade or program dismissal was unfair. See Board of Curators of
Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91 (1978) ("Like the decision of an individual pro-
fessor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to
dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative infor-
mation and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative
decisionmaking."). See also infra note 160.
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ceptions appear to influence abusiveness judgments and lead to the
denial of meritorious claims.
In Moire, for example, the court dismissed the plaintiffs claims of
sexual harassment for lack of "credible evidence."159 Not surprisingly,
the court found more credible the testimony of an established physi-
cian than a third-year medical student, who, according to the court,
may have been "[unable] .. .to perceive men's attitudes and inten-
tions toward her."16 ° In Lipsett and Petaluma, on the other hand, the
courts found believable the harassment claims of victims who also suf-
fered some tangible academic and economic loss. Lipsett was dis-
missed from her surgical residency program1 61 and Doe was forced to
leave her school to attend a private, more expensive school for
girls.1 62 Although neither court included a tangible harm require-
ment in its discussion of hostile environment sexual harassment, each
appeared to be influenced by the evidence of demonstrable harm
before it. The Petaluma court stated that it did not intend "that an
actionable hostile environment does not exist unless the environment
is so bad that the victim feels compelled to quit the institution," 6 ' but
it made no effort to explain what evidence, absent a clear and undeni-
able loss, would be enough to prove a sufficiently abusive or hostile
environment.
This evidentiary problem stems in large part from the fact that no
such standard has been articulated by the courts. Even under the
more thoroughly developed Title VII jurisprudence, no concrete rule
exists by which to judge environmental abusiveness or hostility. In
Harris,' the Supreme Court outlined factors that should be consid-
ered in the abusiveness evaluation, but it offered no guidance as to
how triers of fact should weigh those factors.' 65 Thus, triers of fact
must rely upon their own experience and discretion, often wrought
with misconceptions and harmful stereotypes, to judge the legitimacy
159. Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1362.
160. Id. at 1369. At issue in Moire was a course grade the plaintiff claimed was unfairly
low. Deferring to the judgment.of the educational institution's staff, the court held that
"[iit [was] not [its] role to set grading standards for a professional school but at most to
consider whether a decision to fail a student was rational . . . ." Id. at 1371.
161. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 892. The court did not defer to the judgment of the academic
institution in Lipsett because the plaintiff's quid pro quo claim was particularly strong. See
supra text accompanying notes 130-137.
162. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1566.
163. Id. at 1575 n.10.
164. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
165. See supra text accompanying note 73. The Court "neither sa[id] how much of each
is necessary ... nor identifie[d] any single factor as determinative." Id. at 372 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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of hostile environment claims. Where plaintiffs satisfactorily demon-
strate tangible harm in the form of some undeniable loss, such as job
or program dismissal, their allegations of intangible harm are more
believable. Where plaintiffs fail to prove tangible harm or manage to
leave a hostile environment without incurring any measurable loss,
stereotypes and prejudice may easily seep into the abusiveness evalua-
tion and overcome evidence of severe and entrenched sexism within
the institution.
166
2. The Proposal.-A two-part change in the analysis of hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment claims would significantly limit the im-
pact of sexist attitudes on the outcome of these cases. First, courts
should evaluate the abusiveness of an environment from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable woman (assuming the victim was a woman) rather
than from the standpoint of a reasonable person. Second, the abu-
siveness inquiry should require no more than a finding that the har-
assment made the plaintiff's work or academic regime more difficult.
The dispositive question would then become: Would a reasonable wo-
man find that the conduct at issue made study or work in the environ-
ment more difficult? In Meritor, the Supreme Court held that, in
order to be actionable, sexual harassment must be severe or perva-
sive;' 67 it did not declare that the alteration of the environment must
be severe. 1'6 An inquiry that examines whether a reasonable woman
would have found that the conduct in question made her academic or
work environment more difficult would properly focus the court's at-
tendon on the harasser's conduct, rather than on the appropriateness
of the victim's reactions.
166. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987), for example, the court denied the sexual harassment claim of a woman
whose workplace was plastered with posters of naked women, and where a male employee
customarily called women "whores," "cunt," "pussy," and "tits." Rabidue v. Osceola Refin-
ing Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984). Noting that the woman voluntarily en-
tered an environment where she should have expected such treatment, and that society
"condones and publicly features ... open displays of written and pictorial erotica," the
court denied her hostile environment claim. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620, 622.
Similarly, in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), the court
denied the claim of a woman who alleged that she was constantly propositioned by a super-
visor and that co-workers often slapped her buttocks and remarked about the way they
thought she might act during sexual intercourse. Id at 211-12. The court acknowledged
that the conduct was "demeaning" but found the environment insufficiently abusive. Id. at
213.
167. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
168. EUison, 924 F.2d at 878.
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Prior to the Supreme Court's explicit application of the reason-
able person standard in Harris,'69 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applied a narrower reasonable victim standard in Title VII sex-
ual harassment cases.17 ° In recognition that men often incorrectly
view sexual harassment as harmless amusement to which only overly
sensitive women take issue,1 7' the court decided in Ellison v. Brady to
evaluate the abusiveness of the environment from the perspective of a
reasonable victim. 172 To do otherwise, according to the court, would
allow those responsible to "continue to harass merely because a partic-
ular discriminatory practice was common. " 173 In medical schools
where sexual harassment is commonplace, this possibility poses a spe-
cial threat. A focus on the victim's perspective tacitly recognizes that
men and women often react differently to harassing conduct 174 and
requires triers of fact to evaluate the environment from the perspec-
tive of the victim. Such an inquiry would encourage sensitivity to the
intangible harm caused by sexual harassment and reduce the impact
of prejudice in the abusiveness analysis.
To require a plaintiff to prove only that the sexual harassment
made work or study in the environment more difficult would also re-
duce the influence of sexist attitudes on the outcome of these cases.
Fact finders would have fewer opportunities to inject personal preju-
dice because they would no longer be forced to make difficult judg-
ments about the degree of abusiveness or hostility in the environment.
Rather than assessing the severity of the alteration of the victim's envi-
ronment, the fact finder would need only determine whether the al-
teration made work or study more difficult. Justice Ginsburg
espoused this view in her concurring opinion in Harris. She described
"the critical issue" as "whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which mem-
169. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
170. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
171. For discussions of the male and female perspectives on the impact of sexual harass-
ment, see Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1202-03 (1989); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless
Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1194, 1200-
03 (1990).
172. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
173. Id.
174. Critics may claim that recognition of such differences between women and men
only serves to perpetuate sexual stereotyping. In this instance, however, an acknowledg-
ment of differences between the sexes will more likely legitimize women's reactions to and
feelings about sexual harassment.
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bers of the other sex are not exposed."11 5 To be actionable, she as-
serted, the harassment need only "'ma[k]e it more difficult to do the
job.""1, 76
The 'Job" of many female medical students is unquestionably
made more difficult because of sexual harassment. Although many of
these students do not incur tangible loss as a result of the discrimina-
tion, their educational experience is nonetheless more difficult than
that of their male peers. To evaluate the environment from a wo-
man's point of view and to judge abusiveness by simply asking whether
the victim's work or study was made more difficult on account of the
harassment would reduce the impact of sexist attitudes on the out-
come of these claims.
B. Holding Educational Institutions Liable for Longstanding and
Pervasive Student Peer Harassment
1. The Problem.-The term "peer harassment" refers to sexual
harassment by a victim's colleagues rather than by her superiors. 1 77
Although most definitions of sexual harassment refer to an uneven
balance of power between the harasser and the victim, 178 student-on-
student peer harassment connotes harassment among equals. That is
not to say, however, that power differentials do not exist among peers.
On the contrary, men often wield more power in the workplace or
academic environment than their female counterparts, even in fields
where males no longer outnumber females. 1 79 Female medical stu-
dents are particularly vulnerable because they are pursuing careers in
a field traditionally dominated by men, where the stereotype of the
subservient woman is firmly entrenched.'
The National Council on Women's Educational Programs defines
"academic sexual harassment," such as that encountered by female
175. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Although Justice Ginsburg
found the Court's opinion "in harmony" with her view, the standard announced by the
Court is vague and susceptible to a far less liberal reading. Id.; see supra text accompanying
notes 164-165.
176. Id. (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988) (dis-
cussing racial discrimination)). Justice Ginsburg would apparently apply the same legal
analysis in the evaluation of sex- and race-based discrimination cases, unless sex was deter-
mined to be a bona fide occupational qualification under Title VII. See id.
177. See Sherer, supra note 43, at 2121 n.13 (citing MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B.
BARtcKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL 12
(1991)).
178. In her seminal book on sexual harassment, Professor MacKinnon defined sexual
harassment as "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a rela-
tionship of unequal power." MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 1.
179. See generally Sherer, supra note 43, at 2131-34.
180. Conley, supra note 22, at 351-52.
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medical students, as "the use of authority to emphasize the sexual
identity of a student in a manner which prevents or impairs that stu-
dent's full enjoyment of education benefits, climate, or opportuni-
ties."18' Arguably, the "authority" of male medical students who
harass their female classmates derives from the surviving stereotypes
of women and the history of male dominance in the medical
profession.
Contrary to the mandate of Title IX, victims of peer harassment
are "denied the benefits" of an equal education and "subjected to dis-
crimination" because of their sex.182 As with harassment in the work-
place, student victims of peer harassment find themselves attempting
to learn and study in a belittling and hostile climate. Unlike their
male colleagues, female medical students must expend extra and un-
necessary energy just to overcome the burdens of sexual harassment
in the academic environment.18 3 They experience "feelings of embar-
rassment, fear, anger, frustration, loss of self-confidence, powerless-
ness, and cynicism about education."' a4  According to one
commentator,
A nondiscriminatory environment is essential to maximum
intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part of the
educational benefits that a student receives. A sexually abu-
sive environment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed stu-
dent from developing her full intellectual potential and
receiving the most from the academic program. Any dimi-
nution or deprivation of such an academic benefit on the
basis of sex violates Tide IX.1 5
Courts have acknowledged and reacted to the harm caused by
peer harassment in the workplace by imposing liability on employ-
ers.186 The Supreme Court's only ruling on institutional liability for
hostile environment harassment encompasses employer liability
under principles of agency law.187 Accordingly, courts have applied
the same rule in both supervisor and co-worker Title VII harassment
181. MASSACHUSETTS BOARD OF EDUCATION, WHO'S HURT AND WHO'S LIABLE: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS SCHOOLS 9 (1986).
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
183. See Sherer, supra note 43, at 2134. Students learn to develop a "thick skin," but, as
one fourth-year medical student has remarked, "it gets very tiring having that thick skin."
Glazer, supra note 9, at 210.
184. Sherer, supra note 43, at 2133 (footnote omitted).
185. Schneider, supra note 88, at 551 (footnote omitted).
186. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating
that an actionable hostile environment may be created by supervisors or co-workers).
187. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
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cases: An employer is liable for hostile environment harassment
where the employer knew, or should have known, of the harassment
and did not take action reasonably calculated to end it.' The Lipsett
court adopted this rule for institutional liability claims involving co-
worker harassment under Title IX.'8 9 Until August 1993, however, no
court had addressed the issue of peer harassment in a purely educa-
tional setting.
One explanation for the legal system's lack of attention to stu-
dent-on-student harassment is the difficulty of imposing liability on an
institution for the acts of its students. Although schools exercise a
certain degree of control over students, recent Title IX jurisprudence
reveals that courts are reluctant to impose liability on schools for stu-
dent-on-student harassment because schools and their students do not
share a traditional agency relationship. 9 ' Students are not employed
by the school, nor do they exercise or acquire authority for their ac-
tions directly from the school. Unlike employees who have suffered
sexual harassment by co-workers, students who have experienced har-
assment by schoolmates have had no recourse in the courts.
In Petaluma, the only reported instance ofjudicial recognition of
student-on-student sexual harassment in a purely educational setting,
the court applied agency principles to establish institutional liabil-
ity.' But, although Petaluma found that student peer harassment vio-
lates Title IX,' 2 it held that educational institutions are liable only
upon a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the institu-
tion.19 3 Because students are not agents of their schools, the inten-
tions of student harassers cannot be imputed to the school.
Moreover, even though a school official's knowing failure to correct
the problem may be offered as evidence of institutional intent, the
standard announced in Petaluma is very difficult to satisfy. The victim
188. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (harassment by a supervi-
sor); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901 (citing DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 804-05 (1st Cir.
1980) (racial harassment by co-workers)).
189. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901.
190. See UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (E.D.
Wis. 1991) (noting that the theory of institutional liability set out in Met/tor does not make
schools liable for the actions of their students).
191. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575.
192. Id. at 1571. In formulating its opinion, the Petaluma court consulted with authori-
ties from the Office of Civil Rights, the federal agency charged with implementing Title IX.
Id. at 1572.
193. Id. at 1576. The court held that because Title IX was modeled on Title VII, Title IX
plaintiffs are subject to the same damages limitations as other plaintiffs suing pursuant to
Spending Clause legislation. Id. at 1566. "The point of not permitting monetary damages
for an unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal funds lacks notice that
it will be liable for a monetary award." Id. at 1574.
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must notify the institution of the problem and allow enough time for
the school to remedy the situation.'94 If the student demonstrates
that the problem continued to exist despite the institution's knowl-
edge of the situation, the student still may not have sufficient evidence
of the institution's intention to discriminate.
195
To hold a student victim of peer harassment to such a difficult
standard is unwise and unfair. Hostile environment harassment in the
classroom is as harmful to its victims as co-worker harassment in the
workplace.196 More importantly, peer harassment in the classroom
often leads to peer harassment in the workplace.' 97 By holding educa-
tional institutions accountable for student-on-student harassment,
courts would provide schools the incentive to teach respect for women
and preempt the development of harmful attitudes that underlie the
problem of sexual harassment.
2. The ProposaL -Courts should adopt a new standard for school
liability for hostile environment peer harassment. A departure from
Title VII jurisprudence in this area of sexual harassment litigation is
appropriate for two primary reasons. First, Title VII principles, which
provide no mechanism for the elimination of student-on-student har-
assment, do not satisfy the basic objective of Title IX, namely, the
elimination of sex discrimination in education. Second, student-on-
student harassment is unique to the educational setting. Co-worker
harassment, although similar in effect, is not entirely analogous to
peer harassment in the schools because students, unlike employees,
are not agents of the institution.
Instead of reliance upon agency principles and the requirement
of proof of an institution's intentional discrimination, courts should
evaluate the notoriety and pervasiveness of student-on-student harass-
ment in view of the school's effort to curtail it. They should recognize
the duty of the schools to monitor and make efforts to eliminate any
sexual harassment within the institution. Plaintiffs should not be re-
quired to notify the institution of particular incidents, nor should they
have to prove that the institution set out to discriminate against them.
A better way to measure institutional liability would be to incorporate
a standard similar to that used in negligence cases. If the institution
knew or should have known of ongoing student-on-student harass-
194. See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
195. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1574.
196. See Sherer, supra note 43, at 2155.
197. Id. at 2157 (concluding discriminatory conduct tolerated in our schools often be-
comes the standard of behavior for interaction between the sexes after graduation).
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ment' 98 and took no action to stop it, then the school should be held
liable for negligently permitting sex discrimination in violation of Ti-
tle IX. Even if an academic institution has grievance procedures in
place, it should be held responsible to ensure that the procedures are
effective and to take the necessary steps to eliminate the problem.
Congress enacted Title IX to end sex discrimination in public ed-
ucation."9 The Supreme Court has stated that the statute should be
accorded "'a sweep as broad as its language."'2 °° Surely, under this
mandate, Title IX imposes a duty on publicly funded educational in-
stitutions to monitor the occurrence of harassment within their walls.
As previously discussed, few sexually harassed students elect to use
their schools' internal grievance procedures. 20 1 Thus, in order to
carry out the mandate of Title IX effectively, schools must actively seek
out current peer harassment and implement processes reasonably
aimed to stop it. Otherwise, students will continue to suffer from sex
discrimination in public education, in direct contradiction to Title IX.
Presently, school officials may rely on the refusal of the courts to hold
academic institutions liable for student-on-student harassment to ar-
gue that they are under no duty to monitor or eliminate such harass-
ment. All too often, peer sexual harassment is viewed as confirmation
that "boys will be boys," instead of evidence of an institution's neglect
of its duty to maintain an educational environment free of sex dis-
crimination.2 °2 The pervasiveness of such views serves to downplay
the significance of peer harassment and allows harmful sexual stereo-
types to permeate educational institutions.
198. According to Dr. Bernice Sigmon, Dean of Student Affairs at University of Mary-
land School of Medicine, medical school officials are generally aware of "atmospheric"
harassment problems caused by student misconduct, but few make any effort to "sensitize"
students to the harm caused by sexual harassment. Telephone Interview with Dr. Bernice
Sigmon, Dean of Student Affairs, University of Maryland School of Medicine (Nov. 4,
1993) (describing the situation at the University of Maryland).
199. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
200. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States
v. Price, 393 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)). In fact, as Professor Schneider of the University of
Cincinnati College of Law has asserted, "The inclusion of such prophylactic measures in
Title IX may suggest that Congress perceived a need for broader protection against dis-
criminatory behavior in the academic context than in the employment context." Schnei-
der, supra note 88, at 545.
201. Admittedly, the problem is circular. If students believe they would be helped by
reporting harassment to school authorities, they would use the internal grievance proce-
dures, and the school's duty to monitor sex discrimination might be carried out without an
additional monitoring mechanism.
202. The school counselor in Petaluma exhibited this attitude. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at
1565.
MARYLAND LAW REI EW
In medical schools, where harassment is often commonplace, a
duty to monitor student-on-student harassment would not impose a
heavy burden on school administration. Already medical schools re-
ceive annual reports of student responses to the American Association
of Medical Colleges' Medical School Graduation Questionnaire, 20 3
which contains questions regarding peer sexual harassment.20 4
Although the questionnaire does not address all aspects of peer har-
assment,205 a formal evaluation of these reports might be demonstra-
tive of a school's good faith attempt to monitor sexual harassment.
Additionally, schools could establish their own monitoring mecha-
nisms in the form of trained observers or internal anonymously ad-
ministered surveys.20 6  In practice, survey results could serve as
evidence of sexual harassment, or lack thereof, in student-on-student
harassment cases.
Under this proposal, a school's potential liability for student-on-
student harassment would not be unlimited. A school could avoid lia-
bility by demonstrating that it made good faith efforts to curtail any
harassment uncovered by its monitoring mechanisms. It might con-
duct sensitivity training sessions, appoint a task force, conduct work-
203. Each medical school receives an "All Schools Summary" from the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) as well as the responses of its own students. Tele-
phone Interview with Frances Hall, Director of the Section for Student Programs, AAMC
(Nov. 17, 1993). By distributing this information, the AAMC hopes to encourage medical
schools to identify problem areas in medical education and to implement programs for
their elimination. Id. The AAMC, a membership organization, cannot mandate action by
the schools. Id. Similarly, the American Medical Women's Association (AMWA), which
publishes position papers and suggests methods of dealing with sexual harassment, does
not have the authority to require any action on the part of a school. Telephone Interview
with Sheri Singer, AMWA (Nov. 9, 1993).
204. The 1992 AAMC Questionnaire inquired about "incidents of mistreatment [stu-
dents] may have experienced from other students while in medical school." Three of the
thirteen types of mistreatment listed in this questionnaire specifically relate to peer sexual
harassment: "Do you believe you have . . ." (1) "been subjected to offensive sexual ad-
vances by other students;" (2) "been subjected to offensive sexist remarks/names directed
at you personally;" and (3) "been ostracized by groups of fellow students because of...
your gender." SECTION FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, AAMC, 1992 GRADUATING STUDENT
SURVEY RESULTS: ALL SCHOOLS SuMMARY 35 (1992).
205. The 1992 Questionnaire did not inquire about general sexist remarks that are not
directed at a particular individual but which nevertheless create a demeaning, hostile edu-
cational environment for female medical students. Furthermore, the AAMC does not re-
port the responses of men and women separately. Id. These difficulties could be easily
remedied.
206. Schools must ensure that survey respondents and responses remain anonymous.
Without anonymity, the surveys will fail to provide accurate information for many of the
same reasons that internal grievance procedures do not accurately reflect the incidence of
sexual harassment within academic institutions. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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shops,20 7 or incorporate courses that address sexism in the medical
profession into the required curriculum.0 8 It might also appoint an
ombudsperson, a neutral party to concentrate solely on the resolution
of mistreatment issues at the school.2 1 One simple but often over-
looked method of increasing awareness of a school's intolerance of
sexual harassment is to distribute copies of the school's policy against
sexual harassment to all students and staff.21 ° In addition, it is impera-
tive that schools punish known offenders. 211 Regardless of what type
of action the school takes, it must make both student-on-student har-
assment and other types of harassment prominent issues on campus.
With the implementation of procedures reasonably designed to de-
crease sexual harassment,212 educational institutions could not only
avoid liability for peer harassment that may occur despite its efforts,
but, more importantly, effect real change. The prevalence of harass-
ment would likely decline and students would have more confidence
in their schools' internal grievance procedures. As a consequence,
207. The AMWA suggests conducting mandatory workshops that deal explicitly with the
elimination of sexist language in conversation. Annual workshops that include role-play-
ing exercises for all students may effectively counterbalance the influence of societal sex-
ism. The University of Louisville has implemented such a program entitled "A Matter of
Respect." Leah J. Dickstein, Gender Bias in Medical Education: Twenty Vignettes and Recom-
mended Responses, 48J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S Ass'N 152 (1993).
208. First-year students at Northeastern Ohio University College of Medicine take a
course entitled Human Values in Medicine, and Georgetown University Medical Center
students study Bioethics Problem-Solving during their second year. See BICKEL & QuINNI'E,
supra note 13, at 26 (providing examples of sexual harassment sensitivity curriculum).
209. Id. at 24. Harvard Medical School and Dental School recently appointed an
"ombudsperson." Id.
210. Although Title IX requires that all public educational institutions have a policy
prohibiting sex discrimination, many schools do not make students aware of the policy or
notify them of how and to whom they should report sexual harassment. Telephone Inter-
view with Dr. Sigmon, supra note 198. At the University of Maryland School of Medicine,
for example, the school policy against sexual harassment is not discussed or distributed to
students. Id. Although the University of Maryland's Dean of Student Affairs has reported
his awareness of general "atmospheric" harassment at the school and that sensitivity train-
ing for faculty was under consideration, he knew of no plans for student training. Id.
211. Schools should be careful to avoid First Amendment problems they could encoun-
ter if they adopt policies against certain types of conduct or attempt to punish students for
certain types of speech. See, e.g., UWM Post v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F.
Supp. 1163, 1178 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that a policy prohibiting racial epithets was
ambiguous and overbroad). One commentator has suggested, however, that courts ask not
merely whether a particular policy affects the harassers' freedom of speech rights, but
whether the victims of the harassment will be hurt more if their rights are denied. Patricia
L. Crocker, An Analysis of University Definitions of Sexual Harassment, 8 SIGNs: J. WOMEN
CULTURE & Soc'v 696, 707 (1983).
212. For additional recommended responses to sexual harassment problems, see Dick-
stein, supra note 207, at 152-54. For information about organizations or individuals that
can suggest speakers or-approaches to harassment problems, see BICKEL & QUINNIE, supra
note 13, at 25-28.
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fewer students would need to turn to the courts for relief and stu-
dents, schools, and society at large would benefit.
Under the proposed standard for school liability, educational in-
stitutions would be held liable for proven student-on-student harass-
ment in two instances: (1) when they did not monitor environmental
harassment among students, and (2) when they did not take adequate
steps to curtail such harassment. Although these standards are far
more suitable to Tide IX peer harassment inquiries than the agency
principles applied in Title VII cases, they are not without problems.
For example, courts would have to develop a standard by which to
judge the adequacy of a school's monitoring mechanisms. Simple re-
liance on the number of complaints launched through a school's in-
ternal grievance procedure ordinarily would not be sufficient,"'3
although anonymous survey results might suffice, particularly where
students are required to respond. Ideally, the accrediting body for
medical schools would require the adoption of some form of monitor-
ing as a prerequisite for accreditation.214 If every accredited school
were required to monitor student-on-student harassment, peer harass-
ment disputes would turn simply on whether the school took reason-
able steps to stop ongoing harassment.
It may also be difficult to decide whether a particular action on
the part of the institution constitutes a reasonable effort to curtail
peer harassment since the reasonableness of an institution's actions is
contingent upon the circumstances surrounding each claim. The
amount of effort which must be proven by the school in order to es-
cape liability would have to vary with the amount of harassment at the
school immediately prior to the complaint. An assessment of reasona-
bleness would have to depend on the school's ability to stop the har-
assment.215 If, for example, a school has implemented a mandatory
program to educate students regarding sexual harassment and has
made it clear that student harassers will be punished, then the school
should not be held responsible for the actions of a single deviant stu-
dent. If student-on-student harassment is common, however, and if
213. As previously noted, very few students utilize their schools' internal grievance pro-
cedures. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Therefore, judging the adequacy of a
school's monitoring system by relying solely on the number of complaints would lead to
grossly inaccurate results.
214. In 1992, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education began requir-
ing all sponsoring institutions to provide information to residents about sexual harassment
and methods to address it. BICKEL & QUINNIE, supra note 13, at 24. Medical schools, how-
ever, are not yet subject to any harassment-related requirements. Id.
215. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1572 (N.D. Cal. 1934) (quoting
Katz, 709 F.2d at 256) (dealing with workplace harassment)).
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the school has done nothing more than offer a training session that
few students attended, then the school should be held liable under
Tide IX for its failure to provide an educational environment free
from discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The preceding proposals are intended to provide student victims
of sexual harassment a way of obtaining meaningful relief. Although
the courtroom is not the ideal arena to resolve sexual bias in the
schools, legal action is too often the only realistic means to effect
change and recover damages. 16 As Janet Bickel and Renee Quinnie
of the AAMC have noted, the infusion of women students and faculty
into the medical profession will not eliminate gender discrimination.
"[That] hope ignores the fact that: a) some men need to change; b)
bias is too pervasive for the strategy of 'time' to solve it; and c) sexism
will hamper the progress of young women just as it did their predeces-
sors."217 Even in this age of "political correctness," sexism in
medicine, often subtle in form and hard to uncover, continues to hold
fast. Women students are justifiably reluctant to turn to their schools
for support. To provide them with a realistic alternative in court will
not only give them an avenue by which to fight sexual harassment, but
also give schools the needed incentive to focus on the problem.
Critics contend that pursuing sexual harassment claims in court
will only reinforce the stereotype of the "weak woman" who is unable
to fight her own battles.218 Perhaps the proponents of this view con-
sider the "strong woman" one who is able to endure mistreatment and
avoid confrontation. Such a conviction may make sense to those in-
terested in maintaining the status quo. They label as weak the woman
who forces behavioral change and credit with strength those who tol-
erate harassment. To the contrary, a medical student who files a sex-
ual harassment claim is fighting her own battle. She is refusing to
tolerate discrimination and, despite intense pressure from her peers
and members of the status quo, she is defending her rights.
Critics also argue that courtroom sexual harassment battles will
cause increased bitterness between the sexes.219 Unfortunately, tem-
216. AMWA "encourag[es] and support[s] individual women who experience discrimi-
nation in health care delivery systems to report to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and, where appropriate, to seek legal redress." AMWA Res. 1982.3, AMWA
(1982).
217. BICKEL & QUINNIE, supra note 13, at 28.
218. Sherer, supra note 43, at 2166 (footnotes omitted).
219. See generally C. Leatherman, Legacy of a Bitter Sex Harassment Battle: Rising Complaints,
Frustrations and Fears, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 14, 1992, at Al 7-18 (discussing the conse-
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porary bitterness may be a short term sacrifice women must make in
order to effect long term change. The development of understanding
between the sexes is the ultimate goal, but a refusal to address issues
of sexual harassment for fear of creating bitterness between the sexes
will only delay the inevitable battle for change. In the meantime, wo-
men in and out of the medical profession will continue to endure
unfair and unnecessary harm. Female medical students will continue
to be harassed, and many may be dissuaded from joining the
profession.
The cycle of sexism in medicine will continue until a forced
change occurs. The provision of a viable cause of action against sex-
ual harassment is an important step in the process of bringing about
that much needed change.
KIMBERLY L. LIMBRICK
quences of greater awareness of gender relations on campuses in the wake of the Clarence
Thomas Senate confirmation hearings).
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